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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF UTAH 
IN THE MATTER OF THE ESTATE OF 
LYMAN W. HEMMERT aka L. W. 
HEMMERT, Deceased, 
ROSE NAGY HEMMERT, 
Appellant, 
APPELLANT'S BRIEF 
Supreme Court No. 900482 
Priority (16) 
STATEMENT OF ISSUES PRESENTED FOR REVIEW 
Appellate review of the District Court Judgment involves two 
questions of law to be reviewed for correctness. In both 
instances the standard of review involves a determination as to 
whether the District Court correctly applied the law in 
overturning the jury verdict and entering judgment for the 
estate. In reviewing questions of law, no deference is given to 
the trial court's position. Grayson Roper Ltd. v. Finlinson, 782 
P.2d 467, 470 (Utah 1989) 
(Insert) 
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF UTAH 
IN THE MATTER OF THE ESTATE OF 
LYMAN W. HEMMERT aka L. W. 
HEMMERT, Deceased, 
ROSE NAGY HEMMERT, 
Appellant, 
APPELLANT'S BRIEF 
Supreme Court No, 900482 
JURISDICTION OF APPELLATE COURT 
The Supreme Court of the State of Utah has jurisdiction over 
this matter as an appeal from a final Order of the District Court 
pursuant to UTAH CODE ANNOTATED 78-2-2 (as amended). 
STATEMENT OF ISSUES PRESENTED FOR REVIEW 
Appellate Review of the District Court judgment involves the 
following questions of law to be reviewed for correctness. 
1. Was the District Court correct in applying Florida law 
to determine the validity of the Prenuptial Agreement executed in 
Utah by the parties on September 10, 1976? 
2. If Florida law is applied in determining the validity of 
the Prenuptial Agreement, did the District Court err in entering 
judgment for the estate? 
CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS AND STATUTES HERE INVOLVED 
UCA §75-2-204. Waiver of right to elect and of 
other rights. The right of election of a surviving 
spouse and the rights of the surviving spouse to 
homestead allowance, exempt property and family 
allowance, or any of them, may be waived, wholly or 
partially, before or after marriage, by a written 
contract, agreement, or waiver signed by the party 
waiving after fair disclosure. Unless it provides to 
the contrary, a waiver of "all rights" (or equivalent 
language) in the property or estate of a present or 
prospective spouse or a complete property settlement 
entered into after or in anticipation of separation or 
divorce is a waiver of all rights to elective share, 
homestead allowance, exempt property, and family 
allowance by each spouse in the property of the other 
and a renunciation by each of all benefits which would 
otherwise pass to him from the other by intestate 
succession or by virtue of the provisions of any will 
execut€id before the waiver or property settlement, 
(emphasis added) 
F.S.A. §732-702(2). No disclosure shall be 
required for an agreement, contract or waiver executed 
before marriage. 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
This case was filed pursuant to U.C.A. 75-2-201 whereby 
Appellant, Rose Nagy Hemmert, as the surviving widow of the 
deceased, Lyman Hemmert, exercised her right to an "elective 
share" of the deceased's estate. The personal representative of 
the estate raised a Prenuptial Agreement dated September 10, 1976 
as a defense to the claim for elective share. This case was 
tried to a jury in the First District Court in Brigham City on 
July 12 and 13, 1990 and the jury returned a verdict finding 
there was not fair disclosure in the preparation and execution of 
the Prenuptial Agreement and it was, therefore, invalid. On 
August 10, 1990 the District Court issued a Memorandum Decision 
reversing its own jury instructions, ruling that Florida law 
should have been applied, and determining that since under 
Florida law no disclosure is required in the execution of a 
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Prenuptial Agreement, judgment should be entered for the estate 
and Appellant's claim for elective share denied. 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
Rose Hemmert is an immigrant from Hungary, having come to 
the United States in the early 1970s. She has never had any 
formal training in English. In 1975 she met Lyman Hemmert in 
Miami, Florida. During the following year the parties courted 
each other, both in Florida and in Utah. Rose resided in Logan, 
Utah during the summer of 1976. At that time and for many years 
preceding, Lyman resided in Brigham City, Utah. Lyman's 
attorney, Dale M. Dorius, practicing in Brigham City, prepared a 
Prenuptial Agreement in behalf of Lyman. This agreement was 
executed by the parties on September 10, 1976 in Utah. The 
parties were married in Utah on September 16, 1976. 
Rose testified that at the time the Prenuptial Agreement was 
signed, she had no comprehension as to the meaning or purpose of 
the agreement, but signed it because her prospective husband 
assured her that he would "take care of her." She further 
testified that at the time the Prenuptial Agreement was signed, 
she had not conferred with any legal counsel representing 
herself, nor had anyone who spoke Hungarian attempted to explain 
the meaning or content of the agreement to her. Attorney Dale M. 
Dorius testified that in preparing the Prenuptial Agreement he 
had negotiated with a Hungarian speaking attorney in Florida who 
represented Rose. The telephone records of Mr. Dorius for that 
time period did not document any telephone calls from his office 
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to such an attorney, nor could Mr. Dorius produce any 
correspondence either to or from such an individual. 
Immediately after the marriage the parties traveled from 
Utah to Miami, Florida. During the entire ten and one-half year 
duration of the marriage the parties split their time between 
their condominium in Miami, Florida and an apartment which they 
always maintained in Brigham City, Utah. Lyman returned to 
Brigham City at least five or six times every year. 
At the time of execution of the Prenuptial Agreement and 
throughout the entire term of the marriage the vast majority of 
Lyman's assets were located in Utah. Lyman died on February 9, 
1987. On February 29, 1987 a Petition for Formal Probate of Will 
and Formal Appointment of Personal Representative was filed by 
Lymanfs daughter, Alonna Cook, in the First District Court, Box 
Elder County, Utah. The Petition alleged: "At the time of death 
the decedent was domiciled in this county." 
At trial Dr. Robert W. Belka, Chairman of the Foreign 
Language Department at Weber State College testified as an expert 
witness for the Appellant. He testified about an evaluation 
system used by the United States State Department in evaluating 
foreign language skills. Based upon his review of a 49 page 
deposition given by Rose Hemmert in December, 1989, he testified 
that Rose Hemmertfs English language skills were insufficient for 
her to comprehend the meaning of the Prenuptial Agreement. 
A letter dated March 9, 1981 in Lyman's handwriting 
addressed to an automobile insurance company was introduced into 
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evidence, wherein Lyman advised the insurance company that Rose 
was not fluent in the English language and probably did not 
understand the correspondence which it had sent to her. He 
requested that all future correspondence be directed to him, and 
provided only a Utah address. 
The personal representative of the estate testified that in 
1976 Rose "had a difficult time with the English language." 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENTS 
The traditional and apparently majority rule in the United 
States is that the validity of an agreement is determined by the 
law of the place where the agreement was made. An emerging trend 
advanced by the American Law Institute suggests that the validity 
and interpretation of a contract should be governed by the 
jurisdiction having the most significant contacts with the 
agreement and the parties. The facts in this case dictate that 
under either of the foregoing theories, Utah law must be applied 
in determining the validity of the Prenuptial Agreement. 
In the alternative, if Utah law is not applied to determine 
the validity of the Prenuptial Agreement, this matter should be 
returned to the District Court with directions to conduct a new 
trial. Under existing Florida law, a meeting of the minds is 
necessary to the creation of a valid agreement. Also, under 
Florida law, fraud or misrepresentation may void an otherwise 
valid agreement. The District Court refused Appellant's 
requested instructions on both of these issues. 
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ARGUMENT 
I. THE VALIDITY OP THE PRENUPTIAL AGREEMENT SHOULD BE 
DETERMINED BY THE LAW OP THE STATE WHERE THE CONTRACT 
WAS MADE. 
Counsel has not discovered any Utah Appellate Court Opinions 
concerning the "choice of laws" question presented by this case. 
A review of the case law from other jurisdictions indicates that 
the majority or traditional rule is lex loci contractus. This 
means that the contract is governed by the law of the location 
where the contract was made. The courts seem to particularly 
adopt this atpproach when addressing questions as to the validity 
of a contract. The following citations provide a representative 
sample of this approach: 
Ross v. Ross. 393 P.2d 933, 96 Ariz. 249 (1964), Carlson v. 
Boryla, 490 P.2d 700 (Colo. App. 1971), Dick v. Dick, 355 A.2d 
110, 167 Conn. 210 (1974), Norse Petroleum A/S v. LVO Intern., 
Inc., 389 A.2d 771 (Del. Superior 1978), Fowler v. A & A Co., 262 
A.2d 344 (D.C. App. 1970), Reynolds v. Continental Mortcr. Co. , 
311 P.2d 134, 85 Idaho 172 (1962), Simms v. Metropolitan Life 
Ins. Co., 685 P.2d 321 (Kan. App. 1984), Kramer v. Ballyfs Park 
Place, Inc., 535 A.2d 466, 311 Md. 387 (1988), Boggs v. Anderson, 
381 P.2d 419, 72 N.M. 136 (1963), Telex Corp. v. Hamilton, 576 
P.2d 767 (Okla. 1978), In re Danzf Estate, 283 A.2d 282, 444 Pa. 
411 (1971), Owens v. Haaenbeck-Wallace, 192 A. 158, 58 R.I. 162 
(1937), Padova v. Padova, 183 A.2d 227, 123 Vt. 125 (1962). 
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It is undisputed that the contract involved in this appeal 
was made and executed in the State of Utah. If the parties 
expected the contract to be governed by Florida law, logic 
dictates that a Florida attorney would have been retained to 
draft the agreement. The evidence shows that a Utah attorney 
prepared the agreement. 
The trial court erred in its interpretation and application 
of Florida law. The court ruled that since by statute Florida 
does not require any type of disclosure in the creation of a 
prenuptial agreement, the jury instruction requiring fair 
disclosure as mandated by Utah statute, was improper. However, 
as noted, the Prenuptial Agreement was made and executed in Utah. 
Florida law states that the nature, validity, and interpretation 
of contracts, are to be governed by the lex loci of the country 
or state where the contracts are made or are to be performed; but 
the remedies are to be governed by the lex fori. Goodman v. 
Olsen, 305 So.2d 753 (Fla. 1974). If the trial court is 
consistent in its determination that Florida law governs in this 
case, then the Goodman case mandates that the trial court apply 
Utah law and, therefore, the "fair disclosure11 test, in 
determining the validity of this contract. This means that the 
jury was properly instructed and has rendered a legitimate 
verdict determining the prenuptial agreement invalid. 
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II. UTAH HAS THE "MOST SIGNIFICANT CONTACTS" WITH THIS 
PRENUPTIAL AGREEMENT. 
As an alternative to the traditional lex loci rule, a modern 
trend has emerged which adopts the Restatement (Second) of 
Conflict of Laws approach. Section 188 of the Restatement 
(Second) provides: 
(1) The rights and duties of the parties with respect 
to an issue in contract are determined by the local law 
of the state which, with respect to that issue, has the 
most significant relationship to the transaction and 
the parties under the principles stated in § 6. 
(2) In the absence of an effective choice of law by 
the parties, (citation omitted) the contacts to be 
taken into account in applying the principles of § 6 to 
determine the law applicable to an issue include: 
(a) the place of contracting, 
(b) the place of negotiation of the contract, 
(c) the place of performance, 
(d) the location of the subject matter of the 
contract, and 
(e) the domicile, residence, nationality, place of 
incorporation and place of business 
of the parties. 
These contacts are to be evaluated according to their 
relative importance with respect to the particular 
issue. 
(3) If the place of negotiating the contract and the 
place of performance are in the same state the local 
law of this state will usually be applied . . . 
Restatement (Second) of Conflict of Laws § 188, p. 575 (1969) 
(emphasis added). 
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If the most significant contact test is the law in Utah, 
then the foregoing principles apply to a Prenuptial Agreement in 
the same respect they apply to any other contract. 
Utah Courts have applied general contract 
principles when interpreting prenuptial agreements. 
See DfAston v. DfAston. 794 P.2d 500 (Utah App. 1990), 
Berman v. Berman, 749 P.2d 1271, 1273 (Utah App. 1988). 
(A prenuptial agreement should be treated like any 
other contract). 
A number of states have adopted the most significant 
contacts test, as articulated in the following opinions: Boise 
Cascade v. Utilities Inc., 468 N.E.2d 442, 127 111. App.3d 4 
(1984), Dohm & Nelke v. Wilson Foods. 531 N.E.2d 512 Ind. Ct. 
App. (1988), Ashland Oil, Inc. v. Tucker, 768 S.W.2d 595 Mo. Ct. 
App. (1989), Consolidated Mut. Ins. Co. v. Radio Foods Corp., 240 
A.2d 47, 108 N.H. 494 (1968), Allstate Ins. Co. v. Sullam, 349 
N.Y.S.2d 550 (1973) and Dairyland Ins. Co. v. State Farm, 701 
P.2d 806, 41 Wash. App. 26 (1985). 
In its Memorandum Decision of August 10, 1990 reversing the 
jury verdict and directing judgment for the estate the District 
Court placed significant emphasis on the case of Osborn v. 
Osborn, 226 N.E.2d 814 (1966) 10 Ohio Misc. 171. Appellant has 
no quarrel with the Osborn opinion. In applying Osborn. the 
District Court failed to note distinguishing facts and 
misinterpreted the legal theory of the opinion. In Osborn the 
husband and wife executed a prenuptial agreement in 
Massachusetts, were married in Massachusetts, and thereafter 
returned to the husbandfs home in Ohio. In contrast to the 
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present case, however, the deceased had been a lifelong resident 
of the State of Ohio. The prenuptial agreement had been prepared 
by the deceased's Ohio attorney in the State of Ohio and then 
mailed to Massachusetts. Further, the majority of the deceased's 
property was located in the State of Ohio at the time of his 
death. Finally, Mr. Osborn's estate was being probated in the 
State of Ohio. 
The District Court seems to believe that Osborn stands for 
the principal that the law of the "marital domicile" should 
govern in the validity and interpretation of prenuptial 
agreements. The Osborn opinion makes no such assertion but 
rather bases its decision upon the "most significant contacts" 
test. Osborn states: 
It would appear that Ohio follows a developing 
conflict of laws principle being advanced by the 
American Law Institute which advocates putting more 
emphasis upon the intention of the parties and other 
additional factors designed to apply the law that has 
the most substantial contacts with the agreement in 
question. 
. . . There can be little question that Ohio has 
the most significant contacts with and paramount 
interest in the parties, in the agreement, and in 
questions concerning its validity. Osborn, 10 Ohio 
Misc. 171, 226 N.E.2d at 818. (emphasis added) 
A review of the facts in Osborn demonstrates that Ohio had 
the most significant contacts. That is the standard established 
by Osborn. 
The following facts are dispositive in determining which 
jurisdiction has the most significant contacts with the Hemmert 
Prenuptial Agreement: 
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1. The Prenuptial Agreement was prepared in Utah by a Utah 
lawyer. T. 166 L. 22-25, T. 167 L. 1-3, T. 168 L. 17-18, PI. Ex. 
#2. 
2. The Prenuptial Agreement was executed in Utah. T. 84 
L. 12-23, PI. Ex. #2. 
3. Lyman Hemmert resided in Utah for many years prior to 
his marriage to Rose Hemmert. T. 231 L. 6-20, Def. Ex. #4 and 
#10, Dorius Dep. P. 2 L. 18-23. 
4. Rose Hemmert resided in Utah for approximately two 
months prior to signing the Prenuptial Agreement. T. 53 L. 5-15, 
T. 232 L. 8-18, Def. Ex. #4. 
5. Lyman and Rose Hemmert were married in the State of 
Utah September 16, 1976. T. 59 L. 8-12, Def. Ex. #4. 
6. At the time of execution of the Prenuptial Agreement, 
most of Lyman Hemmert^ assets were located in Utah. T. 172 L. 
14-25. 
7. At the time of his death, most of Lyman Hemmert^ 
assets were located in Utah. (Inventory, Document #21) 
8. Lyman and Rose Hemmert maintained an apartment in 
Brigham City, Utah, throughout the ten and one half years of 
marriage. T. 152 L. 12-15. 
9. During the marriage Lyman Hemmert returned to Brigham 
City, Utah, at least five or six times every year. Rose Hemmert 
returned to Brigham City at least every summer. T. 66 L. 16-24, 
T. 153 L. 3-5. 
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10. Correspondence issued by Lyman Hemmert in 1981 showed a 
Brigham City, Utah, return address. PI. Ex. #1. 
11. The Probate of Lyman Hemmertvs Estate was commenced in 
Brigham City, Box Elder County, Utah, on February 19, 1987. 
(Petition, Document #3) 
12. In her Verified Petition for Formal Appointment of 
Personal Representative, Alonna Cook stated under oath that Lyman 
W. Hemmert was domiciled in Box Elder County, Utah at the time of 
his death on February 9, 1987. (Petition, Document #3) 
Appellant challenges the estate to compile a listing of the 
facts in this case which indicate the State of Florida has the 
most significant contacts with this Prenuptial Agreement. The 
list will be both short and anemic. 
The District Court's judgment notwithstanding the verdict 
should be reversed. Inasmuch as the jury was instructed 
according to Utah law, the jury's verdict should be reinstated. 
III. EVEN UNDER FLORIDA LAW A "MEETING OF THE MINDS" IS A 
PREREQUISITE TO THE CREATION OF A VALID 
CONTRACT. THE COURT ERRED IN DIRECTING 
JUDGMENT FOR THE ESTATE. 
Appellant's requested Jury Instruction No. 6 reads: 
A condition precedent to the enforcement of any 
contract is that there must be a meeting of the minds 
of the parties. That is, an agreement as to what 
constitute the terms or provisions of the contract. 
This mutual assent of both parties is essential to 
create a valid contract. The party who claims there is 
a contract, in this case the estate of Lyman W. 
Hemmert, has the burden of proving that there was a 
meeting of the minds and a mutual assent at the time 
the prenuptial agreement was signed. 
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The trial court refused to include this instruction in its 
charge to the jury and it was, therefore, unaware of any such 
legal requirement. Even if this court determines that Florida 
law should apply in determining the validity of the Prenuptial 
Agreement, Florida law dictates that Appellant's requested 
Instruction No. 6 should have been given to the jury. 
Opposing counsel and the lower court seem to have placed an 
unwarranted amount of emphasis on Florida Statute §732.702(2) 
which states that no disclosure shall be required for a 
prenuptial agreement. In interpreting this statute the Florida 
High Court has stated that the statute does not abolish the 
wife's right to sue to have a prenuptial agreement set aside, but 
only alters one of the elements that the court may consider in 
determining the validity of the Prenuptial Agreement. Estate of 
Roberts, 388 So.2d 216 (Fla. 1980). 
In Florida an essential component to creation of a valid 
agreement is a "meeting of the minds." 
It is essential to the creation of a contract that 
there be a mutual or reciprocal assent to a certain and 
definite proposition. Until the terms of an agreement 
have received the assent of both parties the 
negotiation is open and imposes no obligation upon 
either. Without a meeting of the minds of the parties 
on an essential element there can be no enforceable 
contract. Goff v. Indian Lake Estates, 178 So.2d 910 
(Fla. 1965). (emphasis added) 
The following transcript excerpts demonstrate that there was 
no meeting of the minds because Rose Hemmert had no idea what the 
Prenuptial Agreement said or did. 
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Q. Let's back up for a minute, the papers that Mr. Dorius 
prepared, did Lyman tell you what those 
papers were? 
A, I didn't know who Dorius was. Lyman said we sign 
papers and we go to the meeting. I figure I 
just sign it. 
Q. Did he tell you why you were signing the papers? 
A. No. 
Q. Did he tell you what the papers were? 
A. No. 
Q. Did you know what they were? 
A. I told him, what is this? He said don't worry I take 
catre of you. We signed and later got 
married." (T. 55 L. 6-20.) 
Q. Did Mr. Dorius tell you anything about the papers? 
A. No. 
Q. Did Mr. Dorius ask you if you spoke and understood 
English? 
A. No. We did not talk about anything. 
Q. Did anyone translate the papers or help you by speaking 
Hungarian to understand the papers? 
A. No. 
Q. Did you ever talk with your own attorney, an attorney 
separate from Mr. Dorius before you signed 
the papers? 
A. No* I had no attorney. I didn't know. 
Q. When you signed that paper did you know what the paper 
meant or what it said? 
A. No. I had no idea. (T. 56 L. 2-14 and 23-25) 
After being qualified as a linguistics expert and explaining 
a standardized test used by the United States State Department in 
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evaluating an individual's skills in a foreign language, Dr. 
Robert Belka testified that he had examined a 49 page deposition 
transcript from Rose Hemmert and also examined the Prenuptial 
Agreement. Dr. Belka testified that the Prenuptial Agreement was 
written at a Level 5 language level, which is the most 
sophisticated classification. 
Q. Would a person with Rose Hemmert's 1989 English 
language skills be able to read and 
understand and comprehend Exhibit 5 which you 
have in your possession? 
A. No. As I said, as a general rule you can say 
your productive skills are one level lower 
than the receptive skills. She's Level 1. 
She could read and listen and hear at Level 
1, but Level 5 would be beyond her 
linguistically." (T. 138 L. 1-9) 
The personal representative of the estate, Alonna Cook, 
testified: 
Q. Rose Hemmert had a hard time with the English language 
when you met her, didn't she? 
A. Yes. 
Q. And that would have been back in 76? 
A. Yes. 
In the State of Florida an essential component to an 
agreement is a meeting of the minds. Inasmuch as Rose Hemmert 
had no idea what she had signed nor what the document 
accomplished, there was no meeting of the minds. The lower 
court's directed judgment in favor of the estate must be 
reversed. 
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IV. THERE WAS EVIDENCE OP FRAUD WHICH MIGHT VOID THE 
PRENUPTIAL AGREEMENT# EVEN UNDER FLORIDA LAW. 
THE COURT ERRED IN DIRECTING JUDGMENT FOR THE 
ESTATE• 
Appellant's requested Instructions 8 and 9 read as follows: 
INSTRUCTION NO. 8 
Fraudulent misrepresentations as to the legal 
effect of an instrument will void it, even if made to 
one who has actually read the document, if that 
individual is unable to judge the document's true 
construction; the fraud must be contemporaneous with 
the execution of the instrument and must consist in 
obtaining the assent of the party defrauded by inducing 
a false impression as to its legal or literal nature 
and operation. 
INSTRUCTION NO. 9 
An agreement obtained by misrepresentation, fraud, 
or mistake is generally voidable. 
The lower court refused to give either of the above 
requested instructions. Apparently the court forgot that the 
instructions were vigorously requested. In its August 10, 1990 
Memorandum Decision the lower court wrote: 
The court observes that there has been no claim, 
nor is there any evidence that there was fraud or 
misrepresentation in the initial entering into of the 
agreement and the court specifically finds that there 
was none. (emphasis added) 
Although Appellant did not understand nor comprehend the 
Prenuptial Agreement, she was told by the deceased that he "would 
take care of her." She was instructed to sign the papers so that 
the deceased and Appellant could hurry to a dinner to meet his 
family. T. 55, L. 6-20. Appellant had never had any classes in 
English. T. 52, L. 12-15. There was no translation of the 
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documents, nor Hungarian explanation. T. 56, L. 2-14 and 23-25. 
Appellant could neither read nor comprehend the document. T. 
138, L. 1-9, T. 150, L. 15-19. 
Attorney Dorius testified that there had been a full 
disclosure of all information and that he had, in fact, conversed 
with an attorney who represented Rose and who spoke Hungarian. 
Mr. Dorius1 testimony is in stark contrast to Rose Hemmert's. 
Obviously the jury believed Rose and did not believe Dorius. The 
fraud involved here is representing the document as helpful to 
Rose Hemmert when it was clearly detrimental to her. The Florida 
Supreme Court has said: 
The rule that fraud cannot be predicated on a 
failure to disclose facts where the information is as 
accessible to one party as to the other, and the truth 
may be ascertained by the exercise of reasonable 
diligence, does not justify a resort to active deceit 
or fraud, and hence, does not apply where a party in 
addition to non-disclosure uses any artifice . . . to 
lull him (her) into a false security . . . The 
concealment becomes a fraud where it is effected by 
misleading and deceptive talk . . . or to a covering up 
or disguising of the truth, or to a withdrawal or 
distraction of a party's attention from the real facts; 
thence the line is overstepped and the concealment 
becomes a fraud. Joiner v. McCullers, 28 So.2d 823, 
825 (Fla. 1947). 
There was significant evidence of fraud in the creation of 
this agreement and the inducement of Rose to sign the agreement. 
The lower court's judgment directed in favor of the estate should 
be reversed as a matter of law. 
CONCLUSION 
The traditional rule in determining the validity of a 
contract is that the validity of the contract should be 
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determined by the law of the jurisdiction where the contract was 
made. There is an emerging trend indicating that the validity 
and interpretation of contracts should be determined according to 
the law of the jurisdiction having the "most significant 
contacts" with the agreement. Application of either of these 
approaches to the present case mandates that Utah Law should be 
applied in determining the validity of the Prenuptial Agreement. 
The Memorandum Decision and Judgment of the District Court should 
be reversed and this matter remanded to the District Court with 
instructions to reinstate the jury's verdict. 
In the alternative, in the event the court determines that 
no disclosure was required in the creation of the Prenuptial 
Agreement, this case should still be remanded to the District 
Court for retrial. The District Court erred in refusing to 
instruct the jury concerning the contractual requirement of a 
meeting of the minds and the effect of fraud. 
DATED this /7 day of April, 1991. 
A/ 
BEN H. HADFIELD 
MANN, HADFIELD & THORNE 
ATTORNEYS FOR APPELLANT 
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I hereby certify that on the day of April, 1991, I 
mailed four copies of the foregoing Brief of Appellant to Brian 
R. Florence at Florence & Hutchison, 818 - 26th Street, Ogden, 
Utah 84401. 
BEN H. HADFIELD 
tr/1 -.hemmert.brf 
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IN THE FIRST JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT OF BOX ELDER COUNTY 
STATE OF UTAH 
In the Matter of the Estate of 
LYMAN W. HEMMERT, aka; 
L.W. HEMMERT, 
Deceased. 
VERDICT 
Probate No. 873006067 
We the jury in the above-entitled matter find by a 
preponderance of the evidence that the plaintiff did not receive 
fair discolsure and the pre-nuptial agreement is therefore invalid, 
DATED this 
/2# 
/o> — day of July, 1990. 
^ 
DISTRJ 
\££ue<L 
0093c 
IN THE FIRST JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT, COUNTY OF BOX ELDER 
STATE OF UTAH 
In the Matter of the Estate of: 
LYMAN W. HEMMERT, aka, 
L.W. HEMMERT, 
Deceased MEMORANDUM DECISION 
Probate No. 873006067 
This matter came before the Court on the Estates' Motion 
immediately prior to Trial for a directed verdict and/or Motion in 
Limine with the issue being the relevant law governing the 
determination of the validity of the pre-nuptial agreement. 
The court at that time, denied the Motion because there was 
insufficient time to address the issue appropriately and the Estate 
was given the right to renew the Motion at the conclusion of the 
Trial. The instruction given to the Jury by the Court, essentially 
incorporated the law of the State of Utah as being the applicable 
law with reference to the interpretation of the Pre-nuptial 
Agreement and that Utah law (UCA 75-2-204) required two (2) 
elements: 
1. A signed Pre-Nuptial Agreement 
2. Fair disclosure prior to or incident to the signing of 
the Pre-nuptial Agreement. 
After deliberation the Jury found in favor of the Petitioner finding 
that there was not adequate disclosure. 
At the conclusion of the Trial the Estate renewed their 
Motion in the form of a Motion for Judgment not Withstanding the 
Verdict. The Court now having had an opportunity to review all of 
the material submitted in support and opposition to the Estates 
Motion, issues the following Memorandum Opinion: 
Case Ho8MCt&7~S^ 
MICROFi iMcD .AUG t n ioon 
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MEMORANDUM DECISION 
The Petitioners Petition is essentially that the matter is 
one of contract and that the principles of contract law apply and 
that the law of the jurisidication where the contract was made 
controls; or the law where there were significant contacts with the 
parties or the subject matter of the agreement should control. 
The Estates' position is that in the areas of interpretation 
of Pre-nuptial Agreements the law is that the marital citus of the 
parties should control in the interpretation of the document. 
After the presentation of the evidence, it is clear that the 
following are the essential facts of the case: 
The Petitioner is an immigrant from Hungary having been 
previously married and divorced, she moved to the United States, 
having worked in Hungary as a secretary, including a secretary for a 
lawyer. She had lived in the United States for some period of time 
prior to meeting the Deceased. She met the Deceased who was 
vacationing in Florida and after a rather brief courtship the two 
were married. 
The Deceased was a resident of Box Elder County and was 
previously married for some (30) thirty years having had a family, 
his wife died and he began to travel. In the course of his travel, 
he met the Petitioner in Florida where she resided. He subsequently 
returned to Florida where a brief courtship took place and then he 
returned to Utah. 
The Petitioner subsequently traveled to Utah for a period of time, 
maintaining her residence in Florida but, taking an apartment in 
Logan, Utah. She and the Petitioner received a marriage license in 
Cache County. A Pre-nuptial Agreement was prepared in Box Elder 
County and subsequently executed and notarized as were accompanying 
wills of the parties. The parties then traveled back to Florida to 
reside and were married in transit in Central/Southern Utah. The 
parties set up the marital domicile and resided in Florida until the 
Deceased death. 
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It is uncontroverted that the bulk of the Decedents V property 
is in Utah with the exception of a condominium unit in Florida and 
that during the course of the marriage he frequently returned for 
periods of time to the state of Utah, County of Box Elder, to look 
after his business interests and holdings here while maintaining his 
domicile in Florida. 
The Court is presented, by Petitioners1 Motion, with the 
determination of the applicable law in the interpretation of the 
Pre-nuptial Agreement. It is uncontroverted that Florida Law 
requires only that a Pre-nuptial Agreement be executed as contrasted 
with Utah Law which requires adequate disclosure as previously 
indicated in this opinion. The parties concede that there is no 
Utah Law directly addressing the conflict of laws question presented 
in this case, however, precedent has been supplied by both parties 
in support of their positions as previously outlined. 
A review of the precedent submitted indicates that there is a 
differing approach established by many of the cases in the 
interpretation of marital contracts. This approach, is essentially 
that the matrimonial domicile is a better indication of the 
intention of the parties as to the interpretation and enforcement of 
contracts and relationships, in 11 ANJR, Conflicts of Laws, Section 
86; Page 273, it states in part that; 
"Where thj marriage takes place in the State in which the 
woman has been domiciled but, with the intention of the parties, 
which is carried out within a reasonable time, of establishing their 
common home in another State in which the husband is domiciled, the 
marital rights of the parties in the personal property of each other 
owned at the time of the marriage is governed, as a general rule, by 
the law of the State of their contemplated and subsequently 
established matrimonial domicile; such State is to be deemed their 
initial matrimonial domicile." 
This approach has been taken by the Supreme Court of Wisconsin, 
Florida, Alabama, Illinois, Louisiana, Ohio and New York, although 
it is conceded that there is a difference of opinion among many 
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Courts as to whether the validity of these agreements is to be 
determined by the law of the place where they are made or by the law 
of the matrimonial domicile. 
The Court observes that there has been no claim, nor is there 
any evidence that there was fraud or misrepresentation in the 
initial entering into of the agreement and the Court specifically 
finds that there was none. The Petitioners' position essentially ic 
that she was not informed sufficiently by virtue of the 
circumstances including her language disabilities. 
One of closer cases that the Court could find bearing on this 
situation is the case of OSBORN V. OSBORN, (226 North Eastern 
Reporter, 2d Page 814 et sequence) when faced with a similar 
question, the Court there stated; 
MThe State is concerned in seeing that its concepts of public 
safety are enforced in this area because marriage is a status 
exclusively regulated and controlled by laws of the State of the 
parties matrimonial domicile." The Court later stated, "There can 
be little question that Ohio has the most significant contacts with 
and paramount interest in the parties, in the agreement, and in 
questions concerning its validity. In view of this conclusion it is 
incumbent upon the Court to determine the validity of the 
antenuptial agreement under Ohio law dealing with this subject." 
In the Ohio case, there was a resident of Massachusetts and a 
resident of Ohio, the contract was executed in Massachusetts but the 
parties subsequently resided in Ohio. A situation much like the 
instant case. 
In determining the application of the law of the State of 
Utah to the facts of this case, it is helpful to the Court* to refer 
to Section 75-2-201 [2] U.C.A. wherein it provides; 
"If a married person not domiciled in this State dies, the 
right, if any, of the surviving spouse to take an elective share in 
property in this State is governed by the law of the decedents1 
domicile at death ". 
Since the surviving spouses1 right to take an elective share, which 
she is claiming, is dependant upon the validity of the Pre-nuptial 
Agreement. It appears to the Court that the intention of the 
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Legislature of the State of Utah is consistent with that cf what the 
Court finds to be the majority of the cases in the domestic conflict 
of law area and directs that those rights be determined under the 
law of the place of the decedents domicile at death, which is 
consistent with the marital domicile of the parties in this case and 
that the public interests as stated in the Ohio case, is consistent 
with the statutory directive previously quoted. 
Accordingly, the Court finds that Florida Law is the 
applicable law and that as provided in Florida statute 732.702 
[1988] sub 2; 
MNo disclosure shall be required for an agreement, contract or 
waiver executed before marriage." 
This being the case, Judgment not withstanding the verdict should 
and is Granted in favor of the Estate Respondent in this case. 
Counsel for the Estate to prepare an Order in conformance 
with this opinion. 
DATED this day of August, 1990. 
F.L. GUNNELL 
DISTRICT JUDGE 
-P6 G 
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